A cell inspired model of configuration by Ireland, Tim
3.0 BIOMIMESIS 1 | IRELAND
136_137
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. It first presents a biosemiotic comprehension of 
artefact making, on the basis that both design and life are processes of construction. 
It then presents a computer model to substantiate the position and approach to form 
making. The basic premise is that life is, at heart, artefact making and that the process 
of creation is fundamentally semiotic. All things are coupled, paired or exist relationally 
and the key to assembly is communication and signification; from the perspective of 
both agency (in life processes) and the agent of fabrication (in artificial construction). 
The approach argued for in this paper is thus an effort to capitalise on the artefact 
making processes understood as intrinsic to the generation of shape and form in nature.
The computer model presented is applied as a means to generate diagrams representing 
conceptual illustrations of architectural layouts. A bottom-up approach to the 
organisation of architectural-space is thus presented, which offers a fresh outlook on 
the approach to the automatic generation of architectural layouts. Artificial creatures, 
modelled on Eukaryotic cells, are used as components with which to generate 
configurations articulating patterns of habitation. These components represent 
discrete activities, perceived to be the basic building block of spatial configuration in 
architecture, which self-organise and aggregate to form a cohesive body.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a bottom-up approach to organising architectural-space, which 
offers a fresh outlook on the automatic generation of architectural layouts. Artificial 
creatures, modelled on Eukaryotic cells, are used as components with which to generate 
configurations articulating patterns of habitation. These components represent discrete 
activities. Activity is perceived to be the basic building block of spatial configuration in 
architecture. Attributes, pertaining to input and outputs, establish activities as occur-
ring in chains of action; affected by that which has preceded and affecting that which 
is to transpire. Topology, describing space as a set of points, accounts for this chain 
depicting connectivity and the convening of points to describe form. Activities can have 
equivalence in terms of location, occurrence and so forth, and may thus have varying 
degrees of correspondence. Mereology, a theory of parthood relations, takes regions 
(as opposed to points) as the ontological primitive. Coupling topology and mereology 
(known as mereotopology) defines a more concrete analysis of spatial conditions (Cohn 
and Hazarika 2001), and provides a clearer basis for interpreting, and therefore estab-
lishing the relation between one activity and another. Being artificial creatures these 
activity-components have the capacity to interact with their environment and each other 
and self-organise to form aggregations. The model demonstrates an ecological approach 
to designing in a manner that unites computational design with biological and semiotic 
theory. The theoretical basis of the model is first outlined, and then the computer model 
is presented and described. 
THEORETICAL PREMISE
Taking the basic unit of existence to be the organism-in-its-environment (the living-cell 
being the nascent form), which is coupled to the world through its capacity to sense, 
and thus interpret its surroundings, ‘human-space’ may be comprehended (from an 
evolutionary perspective) by extending the issue downwards to the pattern recognition 
and control processes of simpler organisms; on the premise that the mechanisms we see 
at play in single-cell organisms lead to higher and higher degrees of sign processing in 
humans. The spatiality of an organism is affected through its capacity to sense, which 
underpins perception and capacity to engage with the world. This ability (stemming 
from our cells) is ambient and distributed, and from this perspective space is ‘lived’. 
Effected through the ability to feel or perceive and affect the environment, space is 
a (habitual) state of fluidity and perpetual readjustment articulated through an organ-
ism’s activity and interaction. Having the capacity to distinguish self from nonself, a 
cell is, thus, a model of the ontology of ‘self’ (see Weber 2009 and Hoffmeyer 2008). 
The spatiality of an organism and its engagement with its surroundings may thus be 
extrapolated on the basis of cell (inter)action. This assessment is based on the follow-
ing four principles:
1 As Charles Peirce held, ‘the universe is perfused with signs’, and that a sign is 
fundamentally a difference which holds some meaning for an interpreter perceiving 
said difference in some context (Peirce 1894).
2 Gregory Bateson’s (1972) notion that ‘a difference is a difference that makes a 
difference’ and that on this premise what we refer to as ‘information’ is the plethora of 
differences that exist which an interpreter acts on.
3 A system has identity, which its components share. A difference is therefore 
‘observed’ by a component as something which is not an aspect of its identity, which it 
thus responds to (Luhmann 2006). 
4 Space is social because it unfolds through interaction (Massey 2005) and, as a 
social product, is reflexive. It is both produced and productive (Lefebvre 1995). “Space 
is neither a ‘subject’ nor an ‘object’ but rather a social reality – that is to say, a set of rela-
tions and forms” (Lefebvre 1995, p. 116).
These four principles define the basis of a computational methodology for generating 
architectural spatial formations (outlined below), which is presented here as an approach 
to generating 2-dimensional configurations of activity-space. The paper thus presents an 
alternative approach to generating architectural layouts in manner conveying semiosic 
exchange between self and non-self; which is the core of organismic being-in-the-world, 
and thus a method articulating inhabitation.
A CELL-INSPIRED METHODOLOGY OF CONFIGURATION
In the model presented the collective (social) behaviour of distributed (swarm) sys-
tems is utilised to capitalise on their constructive (i.e., nest building) and configurational 
activities (i.e., agglomeration of slime moulds and food foraging in ants). The distrib-
uted pattern forming and constructive tendencies of these phenomena are adapted to 
the problem of configuring architectural space. Figure 1 depicts the exemplary of the 
computer model to be presented, illustrating how configuration arises from a disorgan-
ised to an organised arrangement. It serves two purposes. On one side it is an abstract 
illustration of an autonomous system composed of various constituents; on the other it 
illustrates a (computing) methodology of configuration; it describes a qualitative-semi-
otic conception of spatial configuration incorporating three levels of assembly. At the 
base-level, discrete components with semiotic competence come into relation with one 
another; forming associations between one another. These semiotic-components detect 
what is out there and, distinguishing a difference, respond relative to a corresponding 
(stored) value, thereby acting on the difference detected. As these associations form, 
they constrain the behaviour of individual components to define couplings between 
associates which coalesce; forming compositions which reflect their form of associa-
tion mereotopologically, i.e., they are connected or have some form of overlap. These 
associations steer interaction between couplings to form assemblages which, at the mid-
level, define patterns of association. In other words level one is the defining of relations 
between discrete components, which come together to form parts at the second level. 
These couplings are steered by new or unrealised associations which subsequently form 
new couplings at the third level to form a body of parts. This ascension could of course 
consist of manifold levels in which component parts form parts of parts, which in their 
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own right form bodies, which constitute meta-bodies, and so on. Figure 1 may therefore 
be redrawn as a series of moments articulating the development of form, instead of, as 
it does, the three step-changes outlined:
1 Discrete components (at the base level) couple according to their relevance (condi-
tioned by their association and state of being). Note the two entities shown to be coming 
into relation, emphasised by the inset illustrating the emergence of overt behaviour.
2 The spatial articulation of these couplings in which the components coalesce to 
form parts, which
3 Converge to form a body of parts; articulated by the dashed line to emphasise the 
formation of a whole.
The computer model is agent-based. The basic component is an actant (see Note 1), 
which represents a region of space specific to a discrete activity. An actant is a semiotic 
entity composed of discrete semiotic components, modelled on the cell: the basic unit 
of all known living organisms which has the capacity to distinguish self from nonself. The 
living cell is thus a model of the ontology of ‘self’. The notion of the semiotic-self is cen-
tral to the conception of this model, emphasised by Hoffmeyer (2008) as extant through 
exchanges between internal and external domains. Orientation is effected through a 
semiotic interface, and by which the disparity on either side of the divide is managed. 
Reiterating Barry Smith’s (1997) account of ‘oriented’ boundaries, Hoffmeyer refers 
to the living cell’s ‘self’ (inner domain) as existing “only in so far as that which is inside 
contains an intentionality towards, or reference to, that which is outside” (Hoffmeyer 
2008: 174): an ascending condition replicated at the scale of an organism responding 
to effects impinging on its territory. An actant distinguishes self from not-self, and is 
oriented via its ability to identify differences in its environment.
The model is composed of several actants (which are swarm-like entities) that coalesce 
according to their relations to generate an aggregation; and articulate a pattern of 
activity. The actants thus act like a slime mould, whereby the individual spores agglom-
erate when starving, to form a single body. The model is thus conceived to be (or to 
generate) a ‘body of swarms’. The notion is predicated on Jesper Hoffmeyer’s (1994) 
paper The Swarming Body (see Note 2). He makes an analogy, describing the body of an 
organism as a hierarchy of overlapping swarms (of swarms) constituting an assemblage 
of cohabitation. “At all levels these swarms are engaged in distributed problem solving 
based on an infinitely complicated web of semetic interaction patterns” (Hoffmeyer 
1994, p. 938). Another theoretical contribution informing this model is Barry Smith and 
Achille Varzi’s (2002) hypothesis of organism-environment relations. They present a 
general theory of niche dynamics to explain how population interactions are projected 
into the spatial dimension. A general hypothesis is thus proposed, for creating causally 
relevant spatial regions that generate spatial formation in a cell-like manner.
AN ACTANT
The basic component of the model is an actant, an artificial creature whose composition 
is depicted in Figure 2. The boundary is a mutable entity whose configuration affects the 
region, which represents a discrete space-of-activity. The boundary consists of nodes 
(boundary-receptors) which are affected by differences in the environment, that can 
effect a centrifugal or centripetal force affecting the actant’s motion. An actant moves 
through the collective activity of its boundary-receptors, which move whilst emitting 
and responding to differences they detect. I will from here on in refer to such differ-
ences as ‘semione’, to denote any kind of sign-vehicle an actant is capable of emitting or 
receiving. An actant deposits a unique semione, thereby identifying itself. Each actant 
has identity, which its components share; represented by colour and an index to which 
other actants refer. A difference may, therefore, be ‘observed’ by a boundary-receptor 
as something which is not an aspect of its actant’s identity, which it thus responds to by 
positioning itself according to its association with the actant detected. The actants con-
figure themselves according to those actants they have an association (or dissociation) 
with by responding to their semione. The nucleus represents the organism (performing 
‘x’ activity), and the boundary delimits the region pertaining to the activity the actant 
represents. Configuration arises in the model as a result of boundary conformation, 
determined by the way the boundary-receptors respond to differences detected; acting 
in accordance with the associations their actant has with other actants.
An actant moves via the collective actions of its boundary-receptors, which (if not 
affected by semione) move relative to their distance from the nucleus and nearest 
neighbouring boundary-receptor. The former is a simple attract-repel mechanism (if 
too close to the nucleus step away from it, and if too distant step towards it); the lat-
ter a repel mechanism from the closest boundary-receptor of the same actant. This 
results in a wandering-like behaviour in which the collective moves in a unified manner, 
reminiscent of the movement of amoebae. An actant wanders in this way for a period 
until, if no other actants are sensed, one of its boundary-receptors extends outwards 
Figure 1
A proto-model system of configuration.
Figure 2
An actant is an autonomous entity with sensorial capacity.
3.0 BIOMIMESIS 1 | IRELAND
140_141
ACADIA 2015 | COMPUTATIONAL ECOLOGIES
to become a ‘hunter’. Having done so, the hunting boundary-receptor will move away 
from the nucleus, extending the actant’s search space to seek associate actants beyond 
its immediate vicinity. If another boundary-receptor is perceived, the hunter will position 
itself according to the relation between the two actants: see right-hand image of Figure 
3. Otherwise the hunter switches back to its boundary-receptor state and settles back. 
This hunting action is analogous to pseudopodia (the cellular extensions) of eukaryotic 
cells when feeding. The propulsion of the hunter-extension can affect the course of 
the actant’s wandering. If no associate is sensed after another period of wandering the 
hunting behaviour is repeated. The autonomy and sensorial capacity of an actant means 
that its form is changeable. An actant is a mutable figure affected by the conditions in 
which it is situated and affected by its composition, motion (and thus time), and its 
relations to other actants.
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
William Mitchell (1998) describes architecture as ‘an art of distinctions’—between solid 
and void, internal and external, and so on—determining boundaries between categories 
around which differences are recognised, and thereby manipulated. The act of distin-
guishing is a process of construction that brings the world into focus; transformed from 
an amorphous muddle into something that can be read because aspects are composed 
by the individual into distinct parts which are organised in some particular way. Smith 
and Varzi (2000) differentiate two types of boundary. Bona-fide boundaries are literal, 
relating to concrete physical objects. Fiat boundaries (such as between one country and 
another, or an arm and a hand) are a matter of perception. Fiat objects are not specific, 
but shaped by the state of the observer, space, and time. Objects such as a table, the 
moon, Ireland, and Ozzy Osbourne are bona fide, but the distinction between their parts 
may be fiat; such as between Ozzy’s head and his body, and the boundary between the 
Irish Republic and Northern Ireland. “One important motor for the drawing of ephemeral 
fiat boundaries is perception, which as we know from our experience of Seurat paint-
ings has the function of articulating reality in terms of sharp boundaries even when 
such boundaries are not genuinely present in the autonomous physical world” (Smith 
and Varzi 2000, p. 6). Whilst architectural endeavour clearly strives to account for the 
nuances of the individual and peoples activity the focus of concern is typically with 
(bona-fide) built form, to which fiat conditions are fitted. Designing a building is typically 
dependent on the past: i.e., what has been done before and experience. In an effort to 
break the cycle and to enable the propensities of a scenario to prompt formation, the 
author seeks to mediate the reciprocity between bona-fide and fiat bounds. The focus 
of this model is the primary condition of generating fiat bounds, through which (with 
further work) bona-fide bounds may be established: on the basis that the bona-fide is 
not necessarily a literal comprehension of the fiat.
An actant represents a discrete activity and thus what its boundary articulates is fiat; 
expressing the bounds of an activity to articulate patterns of behaviour, through the 
actants aggregation. As the interface between variant domains (through which com-
munication is effected and difference is maintained), the boundary is conceived a form 
of agent affected by the multiplicity of interactions between actants with their own tim-
ing, spacing, goals, means and ends. The configuration of the actants results from their 
boundary conformation to context represented tangibly and effected via the sensibil-
ity of their boundary-receptors. The presence of semione is particular to each actant, 
according to meaning and proximity. Semione distinguished by a boundary-receptor is 
an object of focus causing the actant to be oriented.
ACTANT-ACTANT INTERACTION
An activity may have various attributes which may form an input or output. The asso-
ciational possibilities between one activity and another are numerous. El-Attar (1997) 
defines architectural space as “an allocated structure of composed parts, enclosing a 
group of users and their artefacts, the purpose of which is to provide a suitable envi-
ronment for the behaviours and structures that are enclosed.” The composition is 
purposeful, which he specifies “is to provide a desired set of behaviours through the 
structures that compose it, such that these behaviours meet the environmental, social 
and cultural needs of a group of users performing a known set of activities” (El-Attar 
1997, p. 109, p. 121). The information potential of an activity (see Figure 4) provides a 
basis for distinguishing the associations between actants (representing discrete activi-
ties), enabled through a distributed, self-organising process to generate arrangements 
depicting architectural-space. 
An activity in isolation is meaningless. Activities are defined functionally as a component, 
whose function is participation in the production (or articulation) of other activities. Even 
though an activity may have no specific or physical relation with another, its existence 
is contingent on its attributes. An activity is thus governed through association to cor-
responding activities: that an activity is defined by another activity, by which it is effected 
and another activity which it affects. Perceived as a chain, an activity has an input and 
output; goal-directed in an indirect and recursive way, in the sense that something (A) 
affects something else (B) in a manner which supports ‘B’ to be or behave in the manner 
of ‘B’. In this way an activity is defined by a causal chain of connections. Imagining an 
organism’s pattern of inhabitation composed of discrete activity-niches we now look at 
how these discrete niches may combine to form aggregations as a result of their relations 
and how these translate spatially.
The interaction between one actant and another relates to behaviours transpiring from 
the various ways one organism may respond to another encroaching on its territory. 
The encounter may achieve their coupling or hostility and may either result in colli-
sion (in which case their territories will conjoin) or dispute (whereby incompatibility 
will lead to conflict and distancing between them). Otherwise they may be nonchalant 
to one another, in which case their territories may overlap. Withstanding dispute and 
Figure 3
Actants responding to semione; (left) to a semione source, 
(center) following a semione trail; and (right) engaging with 
an associate actant.
Figure 4
Information potential the archetypal activity (redrawn from 
El-Attar 1997).
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nonchalance their meeting leads to deformation of their territories. These potential 
forms of interaction establish the basis of the actants agency; describing the manner in 
which they may interact and how this interaction may be projected spatially. Figure 5 
illustrates how these interactions may be projected spatially, to define a series of relation-
potentials between actants that are subsumptive. The relation-potentials distinguish 
the spatial-property of actant relation as a scale, not of dimension, but as a gradient or 
degree of consolidation.
Defined as a scale, these relation-potentials are measurable and define forces which 
are transferred to the actants as a means by which to (self) organise according to their 
associations. The effect of one activity on another may be positive, negative or indif-
ferent, resulting in forces for conjunction (positive), disjunction (negative) or negation 
(indifferent). The form of association and behaviour of an actant is determined by its 
capacity to sense and distinguish semione. The semione has meaning for an actant, 
being a signal, which it responds to. If the relation is positive it will follow the semione 
‘uphill’, towards the source of production (Figure 3). If the relation is negative it will fol-
low the semione ‘downhill’, moving away from the source. This attract-repel behaviour 
is reminiscent of predator-prey relations. Having detected an associate actant, the actant 
will position itself according to the relation between it and the other, which it does by 
way of its boundary-receptors positioning. Accordingly, an actant is equipped with the 
capacity to ‘smell’ and ‘touch’. The capacity to smell is enabled through the ability to 
distinguish contrasting forms and levels of semione. The capacity to touch is enabled 
through a ‘field-of-view’ which a boundary-receptor uses to determine proximity to 
another boundary-receptor, to settle such that its actant seeks to adjoin. Overlapping is 
realised through boundary-receptors determining whether they reside within the con-
fines of another actant or not. If a boundary-receptor is located within another actant’s 
region the two actants overlap. The degree of overlap may then be determined by the 
number of boundary-receptors an actant has in another’s region.
Figure 6 illustrates several actants settled in different configurations satisfying the 
same associations: ‘a’ adjoins ‘b’, ‘c’ intersects ‘b’, ‘d’ adjoins ‘c’, ‘e’ intersects ‘d’ and ‘f’ 
intersects ‘e’. While the resulting configuration satisfies the individual actant’s associa-
tions, the arising configuration is different each time, because history is a significant 
aspect of the model. The actants’ ‘behaviour’ is tensive, because an actant that has 
settled (once it has satisfied its associations) may become unsettled by another actant’s 
actions. This can cause the overall configuration to unravel, because if a settled actant’s 
associate is unsettled it is then caused to move; spoiling the settled actant’s state of 
harmony, causing them both to re-seek their state of cohesion. This is good, because 
the final configuration rests on the harmony of all actants realising their individual asso-
ciations. Configuration in the model is aggregative, occurring through the individual 
actant’s conformation, determined by the behaviour of the population. The resulting 
configuration is an expression of the actants associations, and is a description not a 
definitive solution.
DISCUSSION
Human activity has developed in-line with social and technological change and our 
changing patterns of activity affect the development of built form, revealing a pattern 
of progress since humankind first progressed from congregating around the camp-fire. 
Strangely enough architects “tend to consider space as an abstract concept and not a 
behavioural phenomenon, and yet paradoxically assume that behaviour will follow their 
predictions” (Lawson 2001, p. 200). By taking a distributed approach this gap may come 
to be bridged. The spatial salience of an organism is an effect of its distributed cognition, 
and this is constructive (Gardner 2011). On the basis that design is a constructive activity 
(Glanville 2006), the distributed cognition of an archetypal organism may be transferred 
to designing on the basis that ‘to design, is to configure’—meaning to arrange elements 
or parts in a particular way so as to satisfy some need—and this is akin to the develop-
ment and survival of an organism-in-its-environment.
Whilst architectural endeavour clearly strives to account for the nuances of the activitity 
of individuals and groups, the focus of concern is typically (bona-fide) built form. The 
fiat is typically fitted to the bona-fide on the basis of what one knows, or what has been 
done before. There is no problem with this—people are adaptable—only it tends to 
articulate the moderate and follow standardisation. Hillier et al. express the morphology 
of social relations encapsulated in built forms to reveal the structure of the fiat operat-
ing from the bona-fide. It is the reciprocity between the bona-fide and fiat bounds that 
the author seeks to mediate, and with this model generate fiat bounds to (with further 
work) establish bona-fide bounds. The methodology (see Figure 1) evokes configura-
tion a process of agency between tangible and perceived. The model presented takes 
a distributed, as opposed to an authoritative, approach, which transpires as a result of 
the collective capacities of the actant (i.e. the components constituting it) and the actant 
population. Additionally, in the model presented, the authoritative self that Mitchell 






3.0 BIOMIMESIS 1 | IRELAND
144_145
ACADIA 2015 | COMPUTATIONAL ECOLOGIES
The actants’ behaviour (see Figure 3) and the results (see Figure 6) illustrate configura-
tions resulting from autonomous interacting bodies, which are themselves composed of 
autonomous components that can distinguish self from not-self. The boundary-recep-
tors exemplify the basis of Figure 1, since it is through these that the relations between 
actants are formed. However, while there is sign-action semiosis is not present in the 
model: see inset of Figure 1. Configuration emerges through the actants response to 
semione but the actants themselves and their associations are defined. As it is they 
come together to articulate their discrete associations (Level 2) to form a cohesive body 
(Level 3). The distinction behind Level 1 raises a key issue with the model. The model 
exemplifies a self-organising process and the arising configuration is (computationally) 
emergent, but the actants have pre-defined components and the associations between 
are planned. Establishing a means for the relations between the actants to emerge, 
as opposed to being calculated, would be a significant benefit because, currently, the 
model simply produces configurations articulating programmed inputs: a typical issue 
with computational and pre-determined systems design. For any relation to emerge 
semiosis would be required to occur in the model, to drive activity not articulated by 
an operator, and thereby the materialisation of the actants extemporaneous spatial 
formation.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents a biosemiotic approach to architectural design. The methodology 
presented is predicated on semiosic interaction being the basis of organismic interac-
tion-in-the-world and how it transfers to designing on the basis that artefact making is 
intrinsic to life. The methodology (see Figure 1) thus seeks to define an approach to 
using computation as a means to designing that embraces the semiosic basis of life as 
an engine through which to drive architectural spatial formation. The computer model, 
as it stands, is a rhetorical device demonstrating the theoretical standing. It is presented 
here as a means to generate activity patterns that may then be used as a basis for devel-
oping architectural layouts. However, the application is subjective, and the model may 
be developed in various ways towards different architectural applications at different 
scales. The author is currently focused on developing the model as a diagramming tool 
to aid the development of conceptual architectural layouts, and for creating causally 
relevant spatial regions that generate spatial formation in a cell-like manner, which may 
then be extended three-dimensionally to volumes.
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NOTES
1. A term borrowed from Bruno Latour (1996) to refer to an autonomous entity-in-its-environment.
2. The idea for this model preceded my review of Hoffmeyer’s paper, but the notion therein presented  
 consummated the idea.
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